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Action Is distributed 
Artifacts will help, support, or guide users in their activity through their culturally 
constructed properties. This idea emerged in various forms in history (Leroi-Gourhan 
1965); philosophy (Simondon 1969); psychology (Gibson 1950, 1982, 1986; Uexküll 
1925; Vygotsky 1978), design (Norman 1991), cognitive science (Pea 1994),and so on. 
Hutchins (1995), observing jet pilots, demonstrated that what flies the plane is not pilots 
alone but the whole cockpit, including instruments, checklists, mapsand so on. Cognition 
is “distributed” in its content as well as in its process. Objects that possess agency are 
called “actants” (Akrich, Callon, and Latour 2006), a term including acting humans and 
material objects alike. When describing activity emerging from subject-object interaction, 
some (Gibson, Norman, Latour) focus more on properties of the object, while others 
(Vygotsky, Uexküll) start from the subject. This chapter proposes a larger systemic view. 
Over the last two decades, I analyzed human activity recorded from a first-person 
perspective, with “subcams”—miniature video cameras attached to glasses of volunteers 
performing their usual activity, at work or elsewhere. With participants we analyzed their 
recordings to make explicit their cognitive processes and the various elements involved in 
their action (Lahlou, Le Bellu, and Boesen-Mariani 2015; Lahlou 2011). 
In doing so, it appears obvious that action is distributed and its determinants as 
well. For example, in the activity of preparing breakfast, we can observe that, as Mother 
sets the table, Father goes to buy croissants, Coffee-Machine brews Coffee, Bottle 
contains Orange-Juice, Alarm-Clock wakes up Daughter, while Thermostat maintains 
House warm, and so on. 
To clarify the distribution of agency, let us look in detail at the determinants of 
action. 
 
Installation Theory 
When you manage to cycle in heavy traffic, this is the result of simultaneously using the 
affordances of the road; of mobilizing embodied skills; of protection by the traffic rules 
that prevent cars from driving you off the road. Society has constructed the built 
environment (the road), trained you to embody skills (cycling, traffic sign reading), and 
runs control institutions (police, traffic lights, rules of the road). On one hand these three 
layers guide and scaffold your individual behavior, enabling you to safely reach your 
destination. On the other hand they make you a predictable road user to others, so we all 
together co-construct a “normal” traffic flow at societal level. The same mechanism that 
nudges and empowers you is also a mechanism of control at aggregate level. 
The urban street is an “installation”; this installation is not located within the 
physical world only or inside your nervous system alone; it is distributed in the built 
environment, in educated and disciplined bodies, in institutions and their enforcing 
agents. Our everyday environment is built by humans; centuries of gradual construction 
have produced “installations” such as kitchens, conference rooms, or cockpits that make 
activity simple, so simple in fact that even novices can perform satisfyingly. Barker 
described such setups as “behavioral settings”: “stable, extra-individual units with great 
coercive power over the behavior that occurs within them” (Barker 1968:17). But we 
must also include the individuals in the installation. 
Installation theory considers how societies guide individual activity by constructing 
“installations,” in which individual subjects operate. Subjects are moved by individual 
motives and intentions, but an installation has a momentum of its own. An installation is 
“a socially constructed system locally guiding a specific activity, by suggesting, 
scaffolding and constraining what society members can/should do in this specific 
situation” (Lahlou 2015). Installation theory is a theory for nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008), but also for more intrusive control. 
As for most important phenomena, a plethora of concepts and theories have been 
proposed in the literature, for example, “affordances,” “disciplining institutions,” 
“structures,” “assemblages,” “environments,” “niches,” “infrastructure,” “channels,” 
“codes,” “norms,” “habitus,” and so forth. Installation theory tiles three layers of 
determinants that were so far separated by disciplinary approach, even though in practice 
they operate as a bundle. The various components of an installation are not located in the 
same medium; they emerge visibly as a functional unit only when they locally assemble 
in action; as a bundle they were gradually constructed in practice, and only as a bundle 
can they be understood. The example of the road above illustrates this: the installation is 
not limited to the visible setting of the pavement; it includes the representations and 
driving skills of the participants, as well as the institutions that regulate the traffic. Each 
is meaningless without the others. 
Within an installation, behavior is funneled simultaneously by (a) affordances of 
the physical setting, (b) subjects’ embodied competences, and (c) social control. What 
characterizes human installations is their intentionality. Their design fits a specific 
purpose: they support a project of activity. Humans make installations for all kinds of 
activities: roads, houses, armchairs, hospitals, cradles, graves, and so on. 
Individuals do have free will (e.g., they chose to get into the traffic), but their 
agency is limited. Clearly, installations have a momentum of their own. Installation 
theory considers that humans usually act in such settings (roads, homes, restaurants, 
hospitals, etc.) where activity is channeled by the cultural installation. Depending on how 
we want to see it, we can consider that individuals use installations as instruments to 
reach their goals; or that installations use individuals to produce an outcome. For 
example, the traffic installation (roads, signs, lights, traffic rules, police, etc.) uses drivers 
to produce smooth transport at societal level; the roller coaster or the night club uses 
Albert as “a client” and as “a participant” to produce “experience” for users, and profit. 
Both perspectives are valid to a certain extent. 
In other words, while Hutchins noted the environment contains mediating 
structures that process parts of the cognitive operations necessary to complete tasks, 
Installation theory considers more radically that our environment contains constructed 
“installations” which coproduce and funnel activity with the human actors as 
components. It must be clear here that installations are not just the context: individuals 
are part and parcel of them. Society does not only install physical artifacts, it also installs 
interpretive structures (the manual) in individuals so the physical layer is used “as it 
should.” For smooth traffic, drivers should know how to drive their vehicle and there 
should be rules that are enforced. And this is indeed the case: society has set up systems 
to embody competences in individuals (e.g., driving lessons, license) and sets of rules of 
the road, with an enforcing body (the Police). These are neither independent nor 
accidental: the three sets of determinants are obviously part of one single societal project: 
smooth traffic. In practice, what the subject can do is the remaining intersection of what 
is objectively possible (affordances), subjectively possible (embodied competences), and 
socially enabled (social control). Amazingly, while this is common sense, the three layers 
tend to be studied independently by different disciplines. In the study of accidents, 
though, it becomes clear that problems occur only when the loopholes of the various 
layers of defense of the system combine (Reason 2000). 
 Installation theory has two aspects. The first is an operational framework to 
describe the determinants of activity. This framework, above, is simplistic, with three 
layers of components; it can be used for analysis and for change management. It is 
practical because the layers indicate where one can act to change the system. 
The theory’s second aspect addresses the evolution of installations. It describes 
the interactions between the components of the model, and genetic, functional, and 
historical mechanisms that produce sustainable systems. During education individuals 
will internalize not only various representations and practices, but also social rules. 
Foucault (1975) described how this embodiment of social rules makes individuals “docile 
bodies” and as a result each actor becomes his own controller. Other society members 
will also encourage and control others into behaving (from smiling or frowning to giving 
directions or orders); societies also have specific control forces (e.g., Police) to ensure 
enforcement. The rules themselves may be reified into artefacts which can become 
actants. Embodied interpretation systems (e.g., mental representations of objects) and 
physical objects themselves are taken in a chicken-and-egg reproductive cycle, with dual 
selection operating in each of the two forms (embodied and material). Institutions are in 
charge of designing, operating, maintaining, and evolving the installations; they monitor 
the dual selection process that make the installation a single, coherent, functional unit. In 
this short chapter we will use only the first part to provide a framework distinguishing 
three types of agency. 
Installation theory considers three types of components that determine action: 
affordances in the physical context, embodied competences of the subject, and social 
influence—direct or through institutions. Affordances afford; competences enable, and 
rules empower and control. The combination of these three layers generates a limited tree 
of possibilities for action at every step; so actors are funneled into the very activity the 
installation is designed for. 
At a physical level, objects have affordances that both limit some behaviors and 
call for some others. Gibson considers that objects immediately display their affordances 
to the senses. For example, a door handle signals how it can be handled and turned 
(Norman 1988: 133-134). Uexküll placed more emphasis on the interpretation by the 
subject, considering the object provides “connotations for activity” (Uexküll 1925). 
Unless one is in the wilderness, we are surrounded by man-made objects, which, as stated 
above, carry some intentionality and affordances by human design. The environment has 
been planted with physical installations. 
The physical level can be used by Humans because they have embodied 
competences to interpret these affordances and perform action. In practice we learn and 
embody new affordances. Someone who never used a fancy door handle (e.g., electric 
button) could stay trapped in the room even if the door is not locked. Representations of 
common objects, material or not (doors, hospitals, democracy, etc.), are shared by the 
population: they are “social representations” (Moscovici 1961; Abric 1994). Social 
representations are the World’s user’s manual. As we see with the example of the door, 
“interpreting” is not only a matter of chaining ideas to perception, but also chaining 
action to ideas. Interpreting a door includes the motor action to open it—or close it. Just 
as the physical environment is planted with physical installations, the minds and bodies 
of Humans are an embodied layer that has been installed with representations and motor 
skills; as a combined result of biology, education, and experience. 
Finally, we take into account what others do and want us to do (or not do). Others 
can influence us by force or menace; most often on our own behalf we are influenced by 
imitating others or anticipating consequences of our actions. Social psychology 
experiments show interpersonal or group influence in laboratory (for extreme cases see 
Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1973, or Milgram 1963); in real life influence is often 
mediated by institutions, and the expected behaviors come in the form of rules. There lay 
the third, social layer of installations: its components are distributed over “other people.” 
This level can hamper and control as well as empower and support. It is the most diverse 
in form since influence can come directly from individuals or from groups, and can be 
mediated by institutions and rules. 
Let’s take again breakfast in the family: Father brings four Croissants; Croissants 
have affordance as “food.” Children will interpret these as edible; they know how to eat 
them. The institutional rules of the family are that Croissants should be shared equally, 
one per person, so if Son wants to take an extra one, other participants will prevent him 
from doing so. Another example in a hospital installation: a cancer patient may afford 
several treatments among which the competent doctor will make a choice; but hospital 
rules will force the doctor to ask the patient’s consent. 
In short, Installation theory states action is supported and guided at three levels: 
affordances planted in the environment, competences embodied in the subject, other 
people and institutions. It suggests that sustainable behaviors are the ones that are 
simultaneously supported by and compatible with these three layers altogether. Agency, 
as the potential for action, is therefore distributed in these three layers. 
 
How Agency Is Distributed 
Activity is a process that gradually transforms one state of things into another. We can 
consider that agency, for a subject who has a goal (“a representation of a specific desired 
final state”), is the capacity to reach the goal in the conditions given. 
The final state is the result of a series of actions performed in a distributed way, 
by the subject and a series of actants: other people and objects. From the perspective of 
the subject, these actants can be resources or constraints, depending whether they support 
or hamper the process of reaching the goal. Agency of a subject, as the capacity to reach 
a goal, is a function of access to resources and liability to constraints. 
We highlighted three layers of determinants: physical affordances, embodied 
competences, and social control. In that framework, what does agency mean? Capacity to 
reach the goal in the conditions given translates into capacity to use the necessary 
components in the three layers above. 
Moreover, as we saw that many contexts were constructed as “installations,” 
having access to an installation that is designed to reach the goal provides agency for that 
goal. This is a first finding: capacity to use (i.e., entitlement and competence) an 
installation provides agency for the goals supported by this installation. But not 
everything is an installation; many goals will not match exactly with the available 
installations; some components will be general enough to be used across the board; and 
so on. 
Let us then look more generally at agency as the capacity to mobilize the 
necessary components of activity. 
Material agency is access to the resources in the physical layer. It includes direct 
and indirect access and control over affordances. For example, I can use my kitchen, my 
car, and the roads in my country. 
Access to resources is not enough. The subject must be able to use them in a 
relevant way. The subject’s embodied agency is the set of embodied education, 
experience, and more generally psycho-physical capacity to interpret. It includes mental 
representations, motor skills, memories of past experience that can serve to interpret 
situations, and so on. Note that these competences can be used for the subject’s goals, but 
also to contribute to other people’s goals, as shown above. 
Activity is constrained by other people. They define and enforce, usually 
collectively, rules in their local domains of control. When operating in these domains, 
subjects must obey local rules, or face the consequences. Social agency is the capacity to 
deal with social forces. This capacity is often the result of the subject’s history in that 
specific community, especially his or her status and roles1. From a subject’s perspective, 
social identity (belonging to various communities) provides access rights to some 
commons (protection, support, common resources). It also makes one subject to those 
rules and accountable to the communities, for good or bad. Being an inhabitant of a 
village may grant access to common meadows for one’s cattle, local clubs, hospital, and 
so on. Being a national of a country provides access to public services, infrastructure, and 
so on. Family, town, country, organization, religious community, party, professional 
body, and so on enable their members to access resources and provide support through 
rules of use. They also forbid certain behaviors. 
Finally, in some cases restrictive laws do not apply to trusted members of the 
community: top managers have no fixed and controlled working hours, some government 
heads are immune to laws during their mandate, and so on. 
We can call institutional agency the agency granted to the individual by a 
community that provides support for action. Institutional agency is about what behavior 
is authorized or forbidden, and this agency is mediated by an institution at the moment of 
acting (an institution is a stable common set of rules in a community). The various layers 
of agency are not independent. 
While this triple layered analysis may appear commonsensical or too 
encompassing in theory, it is handy in practice. Key here is that an installation work as a 
bundle: sustainable performance requires agency in the three realms simultaneously. For 
example, having a car and a road is not enough to drive from point A to point B: one 
must also know how to drive, and drive on the right side of the road; otherwise one may 
face serious problems. By separating the various levels of agency, the installation 
framework facilitates the analysis of cases where agency is contested, hazardous, and so 
on, and also provides handles to act—to empower or to restrict. 
One can be surprised here not to find “power,” as the capacity to force other 
people to perform behaviors, in our analysis of agency. In fact power can appear as brute 
force in embodied agency, as economic power in material agency, as institutional power 
in entitlement. Cognitive authority is one variant of power active in social influence. The 
classic approach of financial capital, cultural capital, and social capital (Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1990) seems to map the three levels of agency outlined by Installation theory: 
access to material goods, embodied skills, and social support.  
Finally, we should note that agency is a situated notion: it is agency to do 
something specific; it is goal-dependent and context-dependent. Agency to make a pair of 
shoes is different from the agency to vote a law or to feed a village. 
In sum, we saw three main forms of agency: material agency (access to 
affordances—direct or through the proxy of social entitlement); embodied agency 
(interpretative competences, where interpretation involves motor skills as well as 
cognitive); and social agency (often mediated by an institution, including capacity to 
evade local rules). Robust agency must combine the three layers. In practice we can 
consider the palette of these three layers to improve a given situation. By distributing 
agency over the layers, we can design interaction and foster or hamper different types of 
behavior. In doing so we can empower (or control) groups or individuals and support 
political or organisational change. Because such approach can be very efficient, and will 
partly rely on nonhuman actants that have no moral concerns, we must be especially 
cautious and ethical in the design process. 
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 Stoetzel (1963: 178) defines role as the set of behaviors that can be legitimately 
expected from the subject, and status as the set of behaviors the subject can 
legitimately expect from others. 
                                                 
